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OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
PORTER, Circuit Judge. 
 
This appeal asks whether, under Pennsylvania insurance 
law, a manufacturer may recover from its liability insurers the 
cost of settling a lawsuit alleging that the manufacturer’s 
product was defective. Consistent with longstanding 
precedent, we hold that recovery turns on the language of the 
specific insurance policies at issue. We will thus affirm in part 
and vacate in part the District Court’s judgment and remand 
for further consideration consistent with this opinion. 
I 
A 
Sapa Extrusions, Inc.1 manufactures aluminum 
extruded profiles, which are formed by pushing a hot billet of 
aluminum alloy through a metal die with a hydraulic press. 
After forming, but before delivering, the extrusions, Sapa pre-
                                              
1 As reflected in the various insurance policies at issue, 
Sapa has changed its corporate identity a few times over the 
relevant years. For simplicity’s sake, we refer to Sapa and its 
predecessors in interest—Alcoa Extrusions, Inc. and Alumax, 




treats the metal and coats it with primer and topcoat. As Sapa 
describes it, “[t]his pretreatment coating process is done in 
multiple stages, involving cleaning and degreasing to remove 
organic and inorganic materials, chemical etching, and finally 
chemical coating to assist with paint adherence.” Appellant’s 
Br. 11. 
For decades, Sapa supplied “organically coated 
extruded aluminum profiles” to Marvin Lumber and Cedar 
Company and Marvin Windows of Tennessee, Inc. (together, 
“Marvin”). App. 155–56. Marvin incorporated these 
extrusions with other materials to “manufactur[e] aluminum 
clad windows and doors and related products.” App. 156. This 
process was permanent, so if an extrusion was defective for 
some reason, it was not feasible to swap out only that extrusion. 
Instead, the whole window or door would have to be replaced. 
Between 2000 and 2010, Sapa sold about 28 million extrusions 
to Marvin, which Marvin incorporated in about 8.5 million 
windows and doors.  
Sapa agreed to Marvin’s “Aluminum Extrusion Coating 
Specification” in 1996. App. 157. This contract provided that 
“the coating used on aluminum extrusions used on Marvin 
window and door products shall meet or exceed all of the 
requirements” of a relevant industry standard. Id. Sapa later 
agreed to revisions of Marvin’s specification that incorporated 
the updated industry standard.  
Over the course of its relationship with Sapa, Marvin 
sometimes received complaints from customers that the 
aluminum parts of its windows and doors would oxidize or 
corrode. At first, Sapa and Marvin worked together to 
determine the nature of these complaints and how to fix them. 
In the mid-2000s, however, there was an uptick in these 
complaints, most of which came from people who lived within 
a mile or so from the ocean. 
In 2010, Marvin sued Sapa in the United States District 
Court for the District of Minnesota (the “Underlying Action”), 
alleging that Sapa had sold it extrusions that failed to meet 
Marvin’s specifications. Marvin asserted claims for (1) breach 
of contract, (2) breach of express warranty, (3) breach of 
implied warranty of merchantability, (4) breach of implied 




negligent misrepresentation, (7) unlawful trade practices, (8) 
consumer fraud, (9) fraudulent concealment, and (10) 
contribution/indemnity.  
Here are the relevant allegations in the Marvin 
Complaint. 
• Sapa made specific warranties to Marvin about its 
extrusions, including that they would “meet the 
applicable [industry] specifications for superior 
performing organic coatings on aluminum extrusions.” 
App. 157. 
 
• Sapa “changed its processes, procedures, and materials 
for the pretreatment of organically coated extruded 
aluminum profiles without notifying Marvin of this 
significant and material change.” App. 158. 
 
• Sapa assured Marvin that the changes to the pre-
treatment process would not affect the quality of the 
extrusions, even though Sapa knew (and intentionally 
concealed from Marvin) that the extrusions did not meet 
Marvin’s specifications. Sapa “represented to Marvin 
that it would fully stand behind its organically coated 
extruded aluminum profiles if they failed to perform or 
were otherwise defective.” App. 161. 
 
• Marvin’s products that incorporated Sapa’s extrusions 
“prematurely failed in coastal installations in the field at 
an abnormal rate.” App. 161. In particular, surface 
finishes were “peeling, losing adhesion, or otherwise 
degrading in a manner which far exceed[ed] the 
minimal corrosion occasionally experienced on 
aluminum clad windows and doors installed near the 
coast.” Id. 
 
• Marvin “expended in excess of $75,000 in repairing 
and/or replacing Sapa’s organically coated extruded 
aluminum profiles [that] experienced surface cracking, 
checking, peeling and/or loss of adhesion in 





Marvin sought monetary damages for “economic losses 
stemming from ‘investigating and responding to’ consumer 
complaints, ‘identifying and qualifying alternative’ extrusion 
suppliers, ‘repairing’ and ‘replacing’ the failed extrusions, 
rebuilding its ‘valuable reputation,’ and experiencing lost 
‘sales and profits.’” App. 10.  
Marvin and Sapa engaged in nearly three years of 
discovery. They then cross-moved for summary judgment. 
Among other things, the Minnesota district court held that: 
• Genuine disputes of material facts precluded summary 
judgment on whether (1) Sapa provided Marvin with an 
express performance warranty, (2) Sapa’s terms and 
conditions applied to the parties’ extrusion deals, and 
(3) Sapa breached its contract with Marvin for the 
extrusions that Marvin had not yet incorporated into its 
products. Marvin Lumber  & Cedar Co. v. Sapa 
Extrusions, Inc., 964 F. Supp. 2d 993, 998–1003 (D. 
Minn. 2013). 
  
• Marvin’s choice to provide Sapa with detailed 
specifications for the extrusions precluded Marvin’s 
claim for breach of implied warranties. Id. at 1005–06. 
(“Marvin may pursue a breach of warranty for Sapa’s 
alleged failure to meet its specifications, but its decision 
to provide those specifications precludes any implied 
warranties that might have otherwise arisen between the 
parties.”). 
 
• Marvin’s claim for negligent misrepresentation failed 
because, under Minnesota’s “independent duty rule,” 
“Sapa owed Marvin no extra-contractual duty of care.” 
Id. at 1006. 
 
• Under Minnesota’s economic-loss rule, Marvin could 
not assert tort claims for any of Sapa’s alleged 
misrepresentations “based on conduct that would 
constitute a breach of contract.” Id. at 1008 (“[A]ny tort 
claim premised on Sapa’s failure to conform to 
[Marvin’s] specifications is premised on a breach of 






On the eve of trial in 2013, Sapa and Marvin settled their 
dispute for a large sum.  
B 
Throughout the period implicated by Marvin’s 
allegations, Sapa maintained twenty-eight commercial general 
liability (CGL) insurance policies through eight insurance 
carriers (together, the “Insurers”).2 Combined, these policies 
supposedly blanketed the relevant period with liability 
coverage. Each policy required an “occurrence”—a term 
specifically defined in each policy—to trigger coverage.  
Sapa tendered Marvin’s claims to another carrier, 
Zurich American Insurance Company, which accepted the 
defense under a reservation of rights. But the Insurers 
disclaimed coverage. So Sapa sued them all in late 2013, 
asserting breach of contract under the twenty-eight policies and 
seeking a declaratory judgment to recover the cost of the 
underlying settlement. The parties engaged in extensive 
discovery before each moved for summary judgment.  
The District Court first held that, to determine whether 
coverage existed under any of the policies for Marvin’s claims 
and the resultant settlement, it could rely only on how Marvin 
had framed its claims in its underlying complaint. The District 
Court thus did not rely on any evidence uncovered in the three 
years of discovery in the Underlying Action. On the merits, the 
District Court analyzed coverage under all twenty-eight 
policies as a group. Agreeing with the Insurers, the Court held 
that Marvin’s claims in the Underlying Action were not an 
                                              
2 Sapa had primary CGL policies through Liberty 
Mutual Insurance Company (“Liberty Mutual”), Pacific 
Employers Insurance Company (“Pacific”), and Ace American 
Insurance Company (“Ace”). Sapa also had umbrella and 
excess policies through National Union Fire Insurance 
Company of Pittsburgh, PA (“National Union”), Insurance 
Company of the State of Pennsylvania (“ICSOP”), Gerling-
Konzern General Insurance Company (“Gerling”), Arch 
Specialty Insurance Company (“Arch”), and Great American 




“occurrence” that triggered coverage under any of the policies. 
The District Court also rejected Sapa’s ancillary arguments on 
other coverage-triggering theories. In sum, the District Court 
held that the Insurers did not have to indemnify Sapa, thereby 
forcing Sapa to bear the full settlement and defense costs itself. 
Sapa timely appealed. 
II 
The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). We have appellate jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the District Court’s grant of 
summary judgment de novo. Specialty Surfaces Int’l, Inc. v. 
Cont’l Cas. Co., 609 F.3d 223, 229 n.1 (3d Cir. 2010). And we 
apply the same standards and presumptions as the District 
Court. Gardner v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 544 F.3d 553, 
557 (3d Cir. 2008).  
III 
The ultimate issue here is whether any of the Insurers 
must indemnify Sapa under their respective policies for Sapa’s 
settlement with Marvin. That final coverage determination will 
require us to interpret and apply the plain language of the 
policies under Pennsylvania law. But first, we must decide 
what facts we may consider in conducting that analysis.  
The parties dispute the proper scope of our review. Sapa 
says that we should examine any facts that Sapa or Marvin 
knew when they agreed to settle. The Insurers respond that we 
may consider only the averments in the Marvin Complaint. We 
think the Insurers’ position is better grounded in Pennsylvania 
law and we see no reason to depart from that precedent here. 
A 
Three points anchor our analysis.  
First, a liability insurer’s duty to defend an insured and 
its duty to indemnify are distinct, though related obligations. 
See Kvaerner U.S., Inc. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 908 
A.2d 888, 896 n.7 (Pa. 2006). Both are creations of contract. 




290–91 (Pa. 2007); Genaeya Corp. v. Harco Nat. Ins. Co., 991 
A.2d 342, 347 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2010).  
Second, in the context of a declaratory judgment action 
to determine an insurer’s obligations, Pennsylvania courts 
consistently apply what is known as the “four-corners rule.” 
See Lupu v. Loan City LLC, 903 F.3d 382, 389–90 (3d Cir. 
2018) (collecting cases). That is, when a policyholder is sued, 
“an insurer’s duty to defend is triggered, if at all, by the factual 
averments contained in [the underlying] complaint[.]” 
Kvaerner, 908 A.2d at 896; Am. & Foreign Ins. Co. v. Jerry’s 
Sport Ctr., Inc., 2 A.3d 526, 541 (Pa. 2010); Mut. Ben. Ins. Co. 
v. Haver, 725 A.2d 743, 745–46 (Pa. 1999) (“A carrier’s duties 
to defend and indemnify an insured in a suit brought by a third 
party depend upon a determination of whether the third party’s 
complaint triggers coverage.”); Ramara, Inc. v. Westfield Ins. 
Co., 814 F.3d 660, 673 (3d Cir. 2016). And “[i]f the allegations 
of the underlying complaint potentially could support recovery 
under the policy, there will be coverage at least to the extent 
that the insurer has a duty to defend its insured in the case.” 
Ramara, 814 F.3d at 673; see Jerry’s Sport Ctr., 2 A.3d at 541. 
If triggered, the duty to defend also carries “a conditional 
obligation to indemnify in the event the insured is held liable 
for a claim covered by the policy.” Gen. Accident Ins. Co. of 
Am. v. Allen, 692 A.2d 1089, 1095 (Pa. 1997). Both duties are 
at issue until the underlying “claim is confined to a recovery 
that the policy does not cover.” Id. 
Third, because the duty to defend is “broader” than the 
duty to indemnify, if a court determines that the former does 
not exist, neither does the latter. See Kvaerner, 908 A.2d at 896 
n.7; Ramara, 814 F.3d at 673. 
B 
Sapa argues two points in response that, it says, make 
the four-corners rule inappropriate here. We find neither 
persuasive.  
First, Sapa points to language from State Farm Fire & 
Cas. Co. v. DeCoster, 67 A.3d 40 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013), which 
supposedly shows that the four-corners rule does not apply 
when determining an insurer’s duty to indemnify. There, the 




indemnify, explaining that the former is broader and “arises 
whenever the complaint filed by the injured party may 
potentially come within the coverage of the policy.” Id. at 45 
(citation omitted). The duty to indemnify, by contrast, “is not 
necessarily limited to the factual allegations of the underlying 
complaint. Rather, there must be a determination that the 
insurer’s policy actually covers a claimed incident.” Id. at 46 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Sapa takes this 
to mean that it may rely on facts outside the Marvin Complaint 
to prove that coverage exists. 
But DeCoster simply rephrases the principles outlined 
above. The duty to defend is “broader” than the duty to 
indemnify, so an insurer must defend an insured against 
allegations that are even “potentially within the scope of the 
policy”—including those that are “groundless, false, or 
fraudulent.” Jerry’s Sport Ctr., 2 A.3d at 541 (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted and emphasis added). To 
offset this initial burden, “[a]n insurer may rely on evidence 
outside of the complaint to ultimately prove it has no duty to 
indemnify.” DeCoster, 67 A.3d at 46 (emphasis added). 
Pennsylvania law thus creates a ratchet of sorts between the 
two duties. The initial allegations in the underlying complaint 
that may trigger the insurer’s duty to defend must eventually 
mature into provable facts to spark a duty to indemnify. See id. 
at 49.  
But this ratchet works in only one direction. Sapa points 
to no case holding that, when an underlying complaint never 
triggered a duty to defend, an insured may rely on facts outside 
the complaint to show that coverage exists. Indeed, were that 
the case, “an insurer would be required to monitor the pre-trial 
developments of a case in which coverage was denied to 
[e]nsure that no discovery sheds light upon a possible claim for 
which a defense is mandated.” Scopel v. Donegal Mut. Ins. Co., 
698 A.2d 602, 606 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997). Sapa’s reliance on 
DeCoster is thus misplaced.3 
                                              
3 We also note that Sapa’s argument to avoid the four-
corners rule also raises a question it cannot answer: what 
outside-the-Marvin Complaint “facts” should we credit? The 




Second, Sapa says that applying the four-corners rule 
would be misguided here because we ought to focus on the 
parties’ knowledge at the time of the settlement. Sapa likens 
this case to Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. Am. Nuclear Insurers, 
131 A.3d 445 (Pa. 2015), and Alfiero v. Berks Mutual Leasing 
Co., 500 A.2d 169 (Pa. Super. 1985). In both cases, the insurers 
had not fully accepted coverage of the underlying disputes 
(either by outright, bad-faith rejection or under a reservation of 
rights), and the insureds, when presented with reasonable 
                                              
litigation was extensive—as shown by the mountain of 
appendices that the parties unhelpfully submitted. And that 
voluminous discovery apparently turned up “facts” supporting 
both sides. Indeed, the Minnesota District Court denied 
summary judgment on many of Marvin’s central claims 
primarily because the two-and-a-half years of discovery at that 
point had produced countervailing narratives and the parties 
could not agree on what had happened. 
 
In Pacific Indemnity Company v. Linn, the court 
explained that its decision on the insurers’ duty to indemnify, 
which might normally encompass facts outside of the 
complaint, was muddled by the parties’ settlement of the 
underlying action. See 590 F. Supp. 643, 650 (E.D. Pa. 1984). 
In other words, “because those cases implicating the duty to 
indemnify were terminated by settlement rather than final 
judgment, it is now impossible to determine on what theories 
of liability, if any, the underlying plaintiffs would have 
prevailed.” Id. So because there were “no factual findings to 
consider in determining which insurers [were] obligated to 
indemnify Dr. Linn,” “the duty to indemnify must follow the 
duty to defend.” Id. We affirmed. See Pacific Indem. Co. v. 
Linn, 766 F.2d 754, 766 (3d Cir. 1985). 
 
So too here. We have little to no fact-finding from the 
Underlying Action on which we could base a nuanced 
coverage determination because the parties settled that case 
before it went to trial. So Sapa’s scope theory would effectively 
force it and the Insurers to try the Underlying Action before 
then trying the coverage case, all without the participation of a 
principal party-in-interest in the Underlying Action—Marvin. 





settlement options, settled without consent from their insurers. 
Babcock, 131 A.3d at 448; Alfiero, 500 A.2d at 171. The 
Alfiero court held that, because the insurer had denied coverage 
in bad faith and because the underlying settlement was 
reasonable, the insurer was on the hook for the remaining value 
of the settlement. See 500 A.2d at 172. The Babcock court held 
that an insurer defending under a reservation of rights that 
refused consent to settle may be liable to the insured for the 
value of a settlement that is “fair and reasonable from the 
perspective of a reasonably prudent person in the same position 
[as they insured] and in light of the totality of the 
circumstances.” 131 A.3d at 463. 
But here, none of the Insurers had accepted any 
obligations under the policies at the time of settlement. And the 
record nowhere suggests (nor does Sapa argue) that any of the 
Insurers’ denials of coverage were in bad faith. So Babcock and 
Alfiero are inapt.  
C 
We will apply the four-corners rule here, mindful that 
Pennsylvania courts have consistently declined to expand it. 
See Lupu, 903 F.3d at 391 (“Pennsylvania courts have 
identified no exception to the [four-corners rule].” (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted)). This was reemphasized 
by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Kvaerner: 
The Superior Court … [erred by] 
depart[ing] from the well-
established precedent of this Court 
requiring that an insurer’s duty to 
defend and indemnify be 
determined solely from the 
language of the complaint against 
the insured. We find no reason to 
expand upon the well-reasoned 
and long-standing rule that an 
insurer’s duty to defend is 
triggered, if at all, by the factual 






Kvaerner, 908 A.2d at 896 (citations omitted). And 
Pennsylvania courts have applied the four-corners rule 
consistently since. See, e.g., Kiely ex rel. Feinstein v. Phila. 
Contributionship Ins. Co., 206 A.3d 1140, 1146 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
2019) (“The question of whether a claim against an insured is 
potentially covered is answered by comparing the four corners 
of the insurance contract to the four corners of the complaint. 
We do not consider extrinsic evidence.” (internal quotation 
marks and citations omitted)); Burchick Constr. Co., Inc. v. 
Harleysville Preferred Ins. Co., No. 1051 WDA 2012, 2014 
WL 10965436, at *8 (Pa. Super. Ct. Mar. 10, 2014).  
In short, Pennsylvania courts have unambiguously 
adopted and consistently enforced the four-corners rule. And 
although this bright-line standard may “leave[] would-be 
insureds in the lurch if a covered claim is not identifiable in the 
complaint,” Pennsylvania courts have allowed for this 
possibility “in exchange for a clear rule’s benefit.” Lupu, 903 
F.3d at 392. Since our mandate here is to apply Pennsylvania 
law, we will again “honor [the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s] 
decision to maintain a simple, bright-line rule.” Id. at 391. So 
we will confine our review to only the alleged facts in the 
Marvin Complaint. 
IV 
Having established the limited scope of our review, we 
now turn to the merits of the parties’ coverage dispute. Our 
analysis proceeds in three steps. First, we examine “the terms 
of the polic[ies,] which are … manifestation[s] of the ‘intent of 
the parties.’” Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. CPB Int’l, Inc., 562 
F.3d 591, 595 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Baumhammers, 938 
A.2d at 290).4 Second, we assess relevant precedent 
interpreting the operative policy terms. Finally, as necessary, 
we “compare the terms of the polic[ies] to the allegations in the 
[Marvin Complaint],” id. at 595–96 (citing Kvaerner, 908 A.3d 
at 896), determining whether Marvin’s factual allegations 
                                              
4 Under Pennsylvania law, we review the plain language 
of a policy to determine its meaning. Baumhammers, 938 A.2d 
at 290. If the text is clear, we enforce it as written. Id. If the 






trigger the policies’ provisions of coverage, see Haver, 725 
A.2d at 745–46. 
We also note at the outset that the District Court erred 
by considering only the headings of the counts in the Marvin 
Complaint. For example, the District Court facially rejected 
Sapa’s coverage assertion based on Marvin’s breach-of-
contract and breach-of-warranty claims without reviewing 
their underlying factual bases. Pennsylvania law is clear that 
facts matter more than labels: “the particular cause of action 
that a complainant pleads is not determinative of whether 
coverage has been triggered[;] [i]nstead it is necessary to look 
at the factual allegations contained in the complaint.” Haver, 
725 A.2d at 745. So our coverage analysis below considers the 
facts alleged in the Marvin Complaint, no matter how those 
facts are arranged to support individual counts. 
A 
We start with the language of the policies. Sapa asserts 
coverage under twenty-eight different liability policies issued 
by the eight Insurers. In general, each policy requires its 
respective insurer to reimburse Sapa for “sums that [Sapa] 
becomes legally obligated to pay as damages because of … 
‘property damage’ … caused by an ‘occurrence[.]’” E.g., App. 
4884 (emphasis added). 
The policies variously define “occurrence.” These 
definitions fit into three categories, which we have named to 
help keep them straight.  
• The “Accident Definition.” Nineteen policies—in 
general, the ACE policies and those that follow form to 
them—define “occurrence” as “an accident, including 
continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the 
same general harmful conditions.” E.g., App. 5358.  
 
• The “Expected/Intended Definition.” Seven 
policies—the National Union policies and those that 
follow form to them—define “occurrence” as “an 
accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to 




Damage neither expected nor intended from the 
standpoint of the Insured.” E.g., App. 930. 
 
• The “Injurious Exposure Definition.” Two policies—
the Liberty Mutual policies—define “occurrence” as 
“injurious exposure, including continuous or repeated 
exposure, to conditions, which results, during the policy 
period, in personal injury or property damage … neither 
expected or intended from the standpoint of the 
insured.” E.g., App. 4263.  
B 
We are also mindful that Pennsylvania courts (and 
federal courts applying Pennsylvania law) have said what 
“occurrence” means. Three cases most inform our analysis.5 
We will summarize them briefly. 
1. Kvaerner Metals Div. of Kvaerner U.S., Inc. v. 
Commercial Union Ins. Co., 908 A.2d 888 (Pa. 
2006).  
Bethlehem Steel hired Kvaerner Metals to construct a 
coke oven battery. Id. at 891. Bethlehem later discovered 
problems with the battery and sued Kvaerner for breach of 
contract. Id. Kvaerner notified its insurer, National Union, 
seeking defense and indemnity under two occurrence-based 
CGL insurance policies. Id. at 891–92. But National Union 
disclaimed coverage, so Kvaerner sued for a declaratory 
judgment. Id. at 892. The policies at issue contained the 
Accident Definition of “occurrence.” Id. at 897.  
                                              
5 Since we are interpreting and applying Pennsylvania 
law, our analysis is controlled by the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court’s decisions and precedential opinions from this Court. 
See Spence v. ESAB Grp., Inc., 623 F.3d 212, 216 (3d Cir. 
2010) (“When ascertaining Pennsylvania law, the decisions of 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court are the authoritative 
source.”); Smith v. Calgon Carbon Corp., 917 F.2d 1338, 1343 
(3d Cir. 1990). Decisions from Pennsylvania’s intermediate 
appellate courts may be persuasive. See State Farm Fire & 





The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reasoned that, under 
the policies’ plain language, an “occurrence … is an accident.” 
Id. And because the policies did not define “accident,” the 
court consulted a dictionary: “‘[a]n unexpected and 
undesirable event,’ or ‘something that occurs unexpectedly or 
unintentionally.’” Id. at 897–98 (quoting Webster’s II New 
College Dictionary 6 (2001)). The court noted that “[t]he key 
term in the ordinary definition of ‘accident’ is ‘unexpected,’” 
which “implies a degree of fortuity that is not present in a claim 
for faulty workmanship.” Id. So “provisions of a general 
liability policy provide coverage if the insured work or product 
actively malfunctions, causing injury to an individual or 
damage to another’s property.” Id. at 898 (quoting Snyder 
Heating v. Pa. Mfrs.’ Ass’n Ins. Co., 715 A.2d 483, 487 (Pa. 
Super. 1998) (original alterations and internal quotation marks 
omitted)). But “[c]ontractual claims of poor workmanship d[o] 
not constitute the active malfunction needed to establish 
coverage under the policy.” Id. (“[T]he fortuity implied by 
reference to accident or exposure is not what is commonly 
meant by a failure of workmanship.” (quoting McAllister v. 
Peerless Ins. Co., 474 A.2d 1033, 1036 (N.H. 1984) (internal 
quotation marks omitted))). 
On top of this fortuity analysis, the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court examined whether any harm befell third-party 
property. See id. at 898–99 (“[A] CGL policy may provide 
coverage where faulty workmanship caused bodily injury or 
damage to another property, but not in cases where faulty 
workmanship damages the work product alone.” (citing L–J, 
Inc. v. Bituminous Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 621 S.E. 2d 33, 36 
n.4 (S.C. 2005))). The court was concerned that allowing 
manufacturers to recover for shoddy workmanship “would 
convert CGL policies into performance bonds, which 
guarantee the work, rather than like an insurance policy, which 
is intended to insure against accidents.” Id. at 899.  
Applying these principles, the court held that, because 
Bethlehem had alleged “only property damage from poor 
workmanship to the work product itself,” Kvaerner’s “faulty 
workmanship [did] not constitute an ‘accident’ as required to 
set forth an occurrence under the CGL policies.” Id. at 900. So 
“National Union had no duty to defend or indemnify Kvaerner 




2. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. CPB Int’l, Inc., 562 
F.3d 591 (3d Cir. 2009). 
CPB was “an importer and wholesaler of chondroitin, a 
nutritional supplement made from animal cartilage.” Id. at 593. 
CPB contracted with Rexall, a nutrition tablet manufacturer, to 
deliver thousands of pounds of chondroitin, which Rexall 
would combine with other substances to create marketable 
tablets for consumers. Id. at 594. Rexall sued CPB, alleging 
that CPB had delivered defective chondroitin. Id. And 
unfortunately for Rexall, it had not discovered the problem 
until after it had incorporated the chondroitin with other 
substances to make the tablets, so Rexall was stuck with nearly 
a million dollars of worthless product. Id. 
CPB tendered the claim to its insurer, Nationwide, 
seeking defense and indemnity under an occurrence-based 
CGL policy. Id. The policy contained the Accident Definition 
of “occurrence.” Id. Nationwide at first accepted the defense, 
but later sued for a declaratory judgment to avoid coverage. Id. 
at 595. 
On appeal, we noted two mistaken theories of coverage. 
First, we explained that, under Kvaerner’s logic, “Rexall’s 
claim that [CPB] provided defective chondroitin, without 
more, would not trigger coverage.” Id. at 596. Rexall’s 
allegations of “faulty workmanship” were “not covered by the 
policy, although the workmanship involved [was] a failure to 
perform quality control as to the product to be delivered rather 
than a failure to build a coke oven to the proper specifications.” 
Id. (citing Kvaerner, 908 A.2d at 899). 
Second, we explained that Rexall’s claim for 
consequential damages did not change our analysis. Id. 
Kvaerner’s logic, we noted, is not limited to situations in which 
only “the work product itself” is damaged. Id. On the contrary, 
“claims for faulty workmanship”—in other words, the failure 
to provide a product as agreed—are “too foreseeable to be 
considered an accident,” even if a faulty product damages 
property other than itself. Id. Because it was “certainly 
foreseeable that the product CPB sold would be used for the 




fortuity” was no different from that involved in Kvaerner. 
Id. at 597 (quoting Kvaerner, 908 A.2d at 898).6  
So Rexall’s claims were not an “occurrence,” and there 
was no coverage.  
3. Specialty Surfaces Int’l, Inc. v. Continental Cas. 
Co., 609 F.3d 223 (3d Cir. 2010). 
Sprinturf, a manufacturer of synthetic turf, was hired as 
a subcontractor to construct football fields for Shasta Union 
High School District. Id. at 227. A different contractor 
prepared the base for each field and Sprinturf installed the turf 
and a third-party drainage system. Id. Shasta sued Sprinturf for 
breach of warranty, alleging that the drainage systems in the 
fields had been defectively constructed and installed. Id. at 
227–28. Because of the resultant water damage, Shasta 
asserted, the fields were unstable and the subgrade was ruined. 
Id. at 228. Shasta later amended the complaint to add breach-
of-contract and negligence claims. Id. 
Sprinturf tendered the claim to its insurer, Continental, 
requesting coverage under an occurrence-based CGL policy 
that contained the Accident Definition of “occurrence.” Id. at 
227–28. Continental first disclaimed coverage, but then agreed 
to defend Sprinturf when Shasta added the negligence claim in 
the amended complaint. Id. 228–29. Sprinturf eventually sued 
for a declaratory judgment that Continental had to defend and 
indemnify on all claims. Id. at 229. 
On appeal, we relied on Kvaerner and CPB in 
concluding that, under Pennsylvania law, “[i]n order for a 
claim to trigger coverage, there must be a causal nexus between 
                                              
6 We also noted that the Pennsylvania Superior Court 
had slightly extended Kvaerner’s logic in Millers Capital Ins. 
Co. v. Gambone Bros. Dev. Co., 941 A.2d 706 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
2008). There, the court reasoned that “natural and foreseeable 
acts ... which tend to exacerbate the damage, effect, or 
consequences caused ab initio by faulty workmanship also 
cannot be considered sufficiently fortuitous to constitute an 
‘occurrence’ or ‘accident’ for the purposes of an occurrence 
based CGL policy.” CPB, 562 F.3d at 597 (quoting Gambone, 




the property damage and an ‘occurrence,’ i.e., a fortuitous 
event.” Id. at 231. We also declared that “[f]aulty 
workmanship, even when cast as a negligence claim, does not 
constitute such an event; nor do natural and foreseeable events 
like rainfall.” Id. (emphasis added). 
Applying these principles, we held that Continental was 
not bound to defend or indemnify Sprinturf for Shasta’s 
original complaint because Shasta had asserted only a breach-
of-contract claim. Id. at 238. As for Shasta’s amended 
complaint, we held that adding the negligence claim made no 
difference. Id. at 238–39. In short, we reasoned that the alleged 
damage to the subgrade (not installed by Sprinturf) did not 
amount to an “occurrence” because it was “foreseeable.” Id. at 
239 (citing Millers Capital Ins. Co. v. Gambone Bros. Dev. 
Co., 941 A.2d 706, 713 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2008)).  
C 
Because of the controlling precedent on what amounts 
to an “occurrence” under Pennsylvania law, our coverage 
analysis is straightforward. Our job is to “give effect” to the 
clear terms of the policies, so we will divide up the policies by 
the three definitions of “occurrence” and analyze them 
separately. See Baumhammers, 938 A.2d at 290 (quoting 
Kvaerner, 908 A.2d at 897). 
1 
Nineteen policies contain the Accident Definition of 
“occurrence”—the same definition that the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court interpreted in Kvaerner and that we interpreted 
in CPB and Specialty Surfaces. See Kvaerner, 908 A.2d at 897; 
CPB, 562 F.3d at 594; Specialty Surfaces, 609 F.3d at 227. For 
these policies, we hold that the factual allegations in the 
Marvin Complaint do not amount to an “occurrence” that could 
trigger coverage. 
At bottom, the Marvin Complaint alleged faulty 
workmanship. The core of Marvin’s suit was that “[s]ome of 
the organically coated extruded aluminum profiles purchased 
by Marvin from Sapa did not perform as intended, represented, 
and agreed.” App. 161. For example, “the surface finish of 




organically coated extruded aluminum profiles has 
prematurely failed in coastal installations in the field at an 
abnormal rate.” App. 161. And as a result, Marvin asserted, it 
had racked up significant costs “in repairing and/or replacing 
Sapa’s [products] which have experienced surface cracking, 
checking, peeling and/or loss of adhesion in installations in the 
field.” App. 162. 
Marvin’s allegations do not amount to an 
“occurrence”—that is, an unforeseeable, “fortuitous event.” 
Specialty Surfaces, 609 F.3d at 231; Kvaerner, 908 A.2d at 
897–98. On this point, Kvaerner directly informs our analysis, 
even though “the workmanship involved here is a failure to 
perform quality control as to the product to be delivered rather 
than a failure to build a coke oven to the proper specifications.” 
CPB, 562 F.3d at 596 (citing Kvaerner, 908 A.2d at 899). Put 
simply, it was “largely within [Sapa’s] control whether it 
supplie[d] the agreed-upon product,” so any liability flowing 
from Sapa’s failure to deliver a product that met the agreed 
specifications was “too foreseeable to be considered an 
accident.” Id.  
Sapa protests this analysis, asserting that third-party 
property damage triggers coverage. But CPB and Specialty 
Surfaces both hold that any distinction between damage to the 
work product alone versus damage to other property is 
irrelevant so long as both foreseeably flow from faulty 
workmanship. See CPB, 562 F.3d at 597; Specialty Surfaces, 
609 F.3d at 238–39. Sapa’s briefing is silent on these cases. 
The bottom line is this: it was “certainly foreseeable that the 
product [Sapa] sold would be used for the purpose for which it 
was sold.” CPB, 562 F.3d at 597. Marvin integrated Sapa’s 
extrusions with its own products, and the eventual damage thus 
foreseeably exceeded the value of the extrusions themselves. 
We explained in CPB that “foreseeable acts which tend to 
exacerbate the damage, effect, or consequences caused ab 
initio by faulty workmanship also cannot be considered 




‘accident’ for the purposes of an occurrence-based CGL 
policy.” 562 F.3d at 597 (citation omitted).7 
Sapa also relies on Sunbeam Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. 
Co., 781 A.2d 1189 (Pa. 2001), to argue that the District Court 
erred by not considering anecdotes of Sapa’s interactions with 
some of the Insurers “in deciding the coverage issues.” 
Appellant’s Br. 46. We disagree. In general, Sunbeam says that 
“custom in the industry or usage in the trade” is relevant to 
explain the “special meaning or usage in a particular industry” 
of certain policy language. See id. at 500–01. For example, 
Sunbeam focused on specific wording that had “a peculiar 
usage in the insurance industry … that [was] different from the 
common usage of the terms.” Id. at 502. But here, Sapa 
nowhere argues or offers any evidence that the insurance 
industry has a unique concept of what an “occurrence” is aside 
from how that term is defined in the policies and under 
controlling precedent.  
To be sure, we interpret a policy’s text “in light of … 
the performance of the parties under the contract.” 
AstenJohnson, Inc. v. Columbia Cas. Co., 562 F.3d 213, 220 
(3d Cir. 2009). Yet admissible course-of-performance 
evidence differs from inadmissible parol evidence: the former 
shows how the parties behave “under the contract”; the latter 
shows the “parties’ pre-contract negotiations.” Id. And the rule 
against parol evidence is firm. See Resolution Trust Corp. v. 
                                              
7 Sapa’s reliance on Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. 
Fidelity & Cas. Co. of N.Y., 281 F.2d 538 (3d Cir. 1960), is 
misplaced. There, PPG sold paint to Columbia Air-O-Blind 
Co., which used the paint to coat its manufactured metal 
jalousies (outside venetian blinds). Id. at 539. Some of the paint 
was defective and flaked off the metal. Id. Columbia sued PPG, 
which tendered the claim to its insurer, Fidelity. Id. Fidelity 
refused to accept coverage, asserting that the alleged damage 
was not “physical injury” under PPG’s liability policies. Id. at 
540. We held that Fidelity had to provide coverage because 
once the paint was baked onto the metal, the paint became “part 
of the finished product.” Id. at 541. Our decision in no part 
hinged on whether the underlying alleged damage was 
“fortuitous,” as Kvaerner clarified the legal standard nearly 




Urban Redev. Auth. of Pittsburgh, 638 A.2d 972, 975 (Pa. 
1994). Sapa points to some parties’ statements and actions 
related to Sapa’s applications for CGL insurance. Appellant’s 
Br. 47–50. This is pre-contractual parol evidence (albeit 
masquerading as a “course of performance”), and thus 
irrelevant to explain the written terms of the policies. See 
Resolution Trust, 638 A.2d at 975–76. Sapa also relies on some 
purported post-contractual data—for example, the supposed 
reasoning for certain premiums. Appellant’s Br. 48. But, even 
assuming this would be admissible, none of Sapa’s evidence 
can contradict the “unambiguous” Accident Definition of 
“occurrence” explained above. See Gambone, 941 A.2d at 711, 
717.8 Otherwise, parties could circumvent controlling 
precedent simply by acting as though it did not apply.  
In sum, the factual allegations in the Marvin Complaint 
do not amount to an “occurrence” as that term is defined in the 
policies containing the Accident Definition. We will therefore 
affirm the District Court’s judgment as it relates to these 
policies. 
2 
Seven policies contain the Expected/Intended 
Definition of “occurrence”—generally the National Union 
policies and those that follow form to them. Given this unique 
definitional language, we hold that the District Court should 
have considered these policies separately. We will vacate the 
District Court’s decision as it relates to these policies and 
remand for further consideration. 
As noted above, the primary difference between the 
Accident Definition and the Expected/Intended Definition is 
that the latter narrows the general category of “accident” by 
including only conditions that are “neither expected nor 
intended from the standpoint of the Insured.” E.g., App. 930. 
We will call this the “Insured’s Intent Clause.” The question is 
                                              
8 Charitably construed, Sapa’s evidence shows only that 
the parties thought coverage would exist for some products-
liability claims. Nobody disputes this. Everybody agrees that 
coverage would exist if conditions amounted to an 
“occurrence.” The parties simply dispute what that term 




whether the Insured’s Intent Clause materially distinguishes 
these seven policies from the nineteen we analyzed above. We 
think it does. 
First, we interpret insurance policies like other 
contracts—we “ascertain the intent of the parties as manifested 
by the [written] terms.” Baumhammers, 938 A.2d at 290; see 
Madison Const. Co. v. Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co., 735 A.2d 
100, 108 (Pa. 1999) (“Words of common usage in an insurance 
policy are to be construed in their natural, plain, and ordinary 
sense.” (citation omitted)). So we must take care not to “violate 
the cardinal principle of interpretation that an insurance policy 
must be construed in such a manner as to give effect to all of 
its provisions.” Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Bosses, 237 A.2d 
218, 220 (Pa. 1968); see 401 Fourth St., Inc. v. Investors Ins. 
Grp., 879 A.2d 166, 171 (Pa. 2005). 
With this in mind, we decline to interpret the Insured’s 
Intent Clause as mere surplusage. If we held that the Accident 
Definition and the Expected/Intended Definition were 
synonymous, the Insured’s Intent Clause in the latter would 
have no additional effect, thereby erasing it from seven 
policies. 
Second, the Pennsylvania Superior Court has held that 
a liability policy containing the Expected/Intended Definition 
of occurrence was triggered when the underlying complaint 
asserted damages “arguably not expected” by the policyholder. 
Indalex Inc. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 83 
A.3d 418, 425 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013). Indeed, the court 
explained that the definition of “occurrence” at issue there (the 
Expected/Intended Definition) diverged from the definition at 
issue in Kvaerner (the Accident Definition) by including 
“subjective language”—i.e., the Insured’s Intent Clause. See 
id. at 424–25.9 
                                              
9 The Pennsylvania Superior Court later purported to 
clarify in unpublished dicta that Indalex did not “hinge[] upon 
the element of subjectivity in the underlying policy’s definition 
of occurrence.” Hagel v. Falcone, No. 614 EDA 2014, 2014 
WL 8331846, at *12 (Pa. Super. Ct. Dec. 23, 2014). The court 
also noted that its language in Indalex was “difficult to 




Third, in an analogous context, Pennsylvania law 
imbues the Insured’s Intent Clause with a subjective-intent 
requirement. In United Services Automobile Association v. 
Elitzky, the Pennsylvania Superior Court interpreted a policy 
exclusion that precluded coverage for damage or injury 
“intended or expected by the insured.” 517 A.2d 982, 984–85 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1986). The court held that this ambiguous 
provision turns on the insured’s subjective intent, “exclud[ing] 
only injury and damage of the same general type which the 
insured intended to cause.” Id. at 989 (“An insured intends an 
injury if he desired to cause the consequences of his act or if 
he acted knowing that such consequences were substantially 
certain to result.”). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court and we 
have both endorsed Elitzky’s statement of the law. See Minn. 
Fire & Cas. Co. v. Greenfield, 855 A.2d 854, 863 (Pa. 2004); 
Aetna Life & Cas. Co. v. Barthelemy, 33 F.3d 189, 191 (3d Cir. 
1994). 
Elitzky’s subjective-intent standard diverges from the 
standard applied in Kvaerner, CPB, and Specialty Surfaces. 
Those cases applied an objective test of what constituted an 
“accident,” explaining that claims for “faulty workmanship” 
were objectively not “fortuitous” enough to clear that bar. See 
Kvaerner, 908 A.2d at 898–99; CPB, 562 F.3d at 596–97; 
Specialty Surfaces, 609 F.3d at 238–39. In particular, Kvaerner 
expressed concern that any other holding would “convert a 
policy for insurance into a performance bond.” Kvaerner, 908 
A.2d at 899. CPB explained that “the failure to provide [a 
product as agreed-upon] is too foreseeable to be considered an 
accident.” CPB, 562 F.3d at 596. And Specialty Surfaces added 
that “damages that are a reasonably foreseeable result of the 
faulty workmanship are also not covered under a commercial 
general liability policy.” Specialty Surfaces, 609 F.3d at 239 
(citations omitted). But none of those cases interpreted or 
                                              
holding was mainly based on other grounds. Id. Yet Indalex 
was correct to recognize the differing language between the 
policies at issue there and in Kvaerner, especially considering 
the presumption against ignoring contractual language 
explained above. The Insurers’ reliance on Hagel is thus 
misplaced. We find persuasive Indalex’s explanation that the 
“subjective language” of the Insured’s Intent Clause may have 




applied the Expected/Intended Definition of occurrence at 
issue here.10 And thus none of those cases analyzed, or even 
considered relevant, the subjective intent and expectations of 
the insured.  
For these reasons, we predict that the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court would follow Elitzky and find that the 
Expected/Intended Definition of “occurrence” is ambiguous. 
See Elitzky, 517 A.2d at 989. We also predict that the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court would construe the subjective-
language against the insurer, holding that Elitzky should guide 
our interpretation instead of Kvaerner. So we hold that, under 
the Expected/Intended Definition, an “occurrence” includes 
those conditions not “of the same general type which the 
insured intended to cause.” Elitzky, 517 A.2d at 989.  
The District Court did not separately analyze these 
seven policies, grouping them instead with the cohort of 
Accident Definition policies. That was error, since courts must 
review and enforce insurance policies according to their terms. 
And the operative term of these seven policies—the 
Expected/Intended Definition of “occurrence”—is materially 
unique. So we will vacate the District Court’s decision as it 
relates to these seven policies and remand for further 
consideration consistent with this opinion.  
3 
Two policies—the Liberty Mutual Policies—contain 
the Injurious Exposure Definition of “occurrence.” As noted 
                                              
10 We recognize that Kvaerner equated an “accident” 
with something “unexpected”—i.e., “a degree of fortuity that 
is not present in a claim for faulty workmanship.” 908 A.2d at 
898. Yet nothing in Kvaerner suggests that the court thought 
“fortuity” should be measured subjectively. On the contrary, 
the court held that claims for faulty workmanship were 
categorically not fortuitous. See id. at 899. Under the Accident 
Definition at issue there, the court reasoned that including 
objectively foreseeable, but subjectively unintended damage in 
the definition of “occurrence” would create “an overly broad 
interpretation of accident.” Id. at 899 n.9. Kvaerner’s holding 
is, on this question, limited to the text of the Accident 




above, this definition is identical to the Expected/Intended 
Definition, except that it uses the term “injurious exposure” 
instead of “accident.” The District Court did not analyze these 
policies separately, despite their unique wording. As a result, 
as with the seven policies containing the Expected/Intended 
Definition, and for many of the same reasons, we will vacate 
the District Court’s decision as it relates to these two policies 
and remand for further individualized consideration consistent 
with this opinion. 
*   *   *   *   * 
To sum up, the rule we reemphasize here is simple: in 
Pennsylvania, insurance policies must be interpreted and 
applied in accordance with their plain language and relevant 
Pennsylvania law. We believe that this rule best allows the 
parties to an insurance policy to structure their contractual 
relationship as they see fit.  
As explained above, for the nineteen policies that 
contain the Accident Definition of “occurrence,” under 
Kvaerner, CPB, and Specialty Surfaces, Marvin’s 
allegations—which, at their core, are solely for faulty 
workmanship—do not trigger coverage. We will thus affirm 
the District Court’s decision as it relates to these policies.  
For the seven policies that contain the 
Expected/Intended Definition of “occurrence,” we hold that 
the Insured’s Intent Clause triggers the subjective-intent 
standard from Elitzky. We will vacate the District Court’s 
decision as it relates to these policies and remand for further 
consideration consistent with this opinion. 
And for the two policies that contain the Injurious 
Exposure Definition of “occurrence,” since they also include 
the Insured’s Intent Clause, we will vacate the District Court’s 
decision and remand for further consideration consistent with 
this opinion. 
To be clear, we take no position on whether Sapa may 
ultimately recover under any of the policies we are remanding 
to the District Court for more consideration. Given the 
extensive record and the amount in controversy, the parties 




arguments, including various theories of triggering conditions, 
under those policies before the District Court in the first 
instance.  
V 
For these reasons, we will affirm in part and vacate in 
part the District Court’s decision and remand for additional 
consideration consistent with this opinion. 
